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Towards a coordinated strategy for intercepting human 
disease emergence in Africa
Emerging zoonotic viruses are one of the greatest 
threats to human health and security, as evidenced by 
the increasing frequency of disease outbreaks.1 To date, 
the main pre-emptive response to these outbreaks has 
been extensive, cost-heavy efforts to document virus 
diversity in wildlife (eg, PREDICT and the Global Virome 
Projects).2,3 Although these efforts have resulted in the 
identification of thousands of novel viruses, fewer than 
1% are described to date, substantial challenges remain 
around access and benefit sharing from viral discovery 
programmes, and—perhaps most problematic for public 
health application—the spillover hazard of these viruses 
can only be coarsely inferred at present.4–6 
Our ability to control and restrict the spread of 
infectious diseases is critically dependent on early 
detection. This vigilance should include viruses that 
might not pose immediate or widespread public health 
threats, but where repeated spillover or persistent, 
unchecked transmission chains in humans provides 
latitude for the evolution of increased pathogenicity, 
host immune evasion mechanisms, and efficient 
human-to-human transmission.7 Building on existing 
research, here we emphasise the importance of a 
coordinated and targeted strategy for early detection 
of virus spillover and emergence in humans. This model 
is based on inter-related study or evidence types and is 
a collaborative framework geared towards African and 
other low-income and middle-income countries where 
risk of disease emergence is often great, infectious 
disease-related morbidity and mortality are over-
represented compared with in high-income regions, 
undescribed virus diversity is high, and resources are 
constrained. 
For this strategy we highlight four complementary 
study or evidence types indicative of past or current 
unknown infection: procurement and screening of 
diagnostic samples from undiagnosed patients, analysis 
of samples from suspicious fatalities of unknown 
cause, serosurveys of high-risk or sentinel groups, and 
analysis of archived samples (appendix p 1). Approaches 
might overlap (eg, death and post-mortem analysis 
of undiagnosed patients) but are independently 
capable of detecting separate evidence for pathogen 
spillover and novel disease emergence. Their concurrent 
implementation heightens detectability.
Collecting and screening samples from patients with 
undiagnosed febrile illness provides an efficient means 
to target the subset of populations most likely to have 
novel infectious diseases. With properly trained staff and 
systems, sample collections can be implemented at the 
point of care for continuous monitoring. When possible, 
collecting and screening samples from people with an 
unknown cause of death can identify cases of severe 
disease that might not remain in hospitals sufficiently 
long for inclusion in a monitoring strategy, present with 
unusual symptoms, or develop severe disease but not 
present to a hospital or clinic, as is likely to occur in low-
income and middle-income countries where traditional 
medicine is practiced. Although new technologies such 
as next-generation sequencing are increasingly available 
for detection of unknown viruses, linking clinical 
findings to disease aetiology can be a challenge. Due 
consideration must also be given to sample types for 
collection and their appropriate storage. 
By contrast, serosurveys or screening of sentinel 
groups are proactive studies implemented by 
researchers to collect blood samples from individuals 
at greatest risk of exposure to zoonotic viruses. Such 
individuals include pastoralists, agriculture workers, 
game hunters, traders, or others working in close 
contact with wildlife. Studies can detect antibodies 
indicative of spillover events, including asymptomatic 
cases, and use increasingly efficient and cost-effective 
screening methods. Likewise, archived samples provide 
varied, potentially copious, and readily available sample 
sources that are appropriate for detection of viruses 
and antibodies indicative of spillover across longer 
timescales. Like focused serosurveys, archived samples 
can be especially powerful for identifying viruses that 
are silently circulating among humans or rare spillover 
events that could have future implications. These 
samples also provide important datapoints for efforts 
to track the effect of global environmental changes on 
virus spillover, given that most forecasting efforts do 
not have empirical real-time validation. An important 
limitation of antibody surveillance is the inability to 
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identify active infections or specific viruses. But these 
approaches can prompt and guide focused investigation 
and are integral to a comprehensive strategy. 
None of the methods or evidence types that we 
describe here are novel tools and each has limitations;8–10 
however, we highlight the value of a cohesive, targeted, 
and widespread approach for maximising the likelihood 
of detecting novel infections (appendix p 1). We 
acknowledge that in some settings or situations some 
of the proposed approaches might not be appropriate or 
might need to be adapted. 
Ongoing research aims to develop predictive tools so 
that we might be able to infer the zoonotic potential of the 
ever-increasing number of newly identified wildlife viruses 
from their genetic sequence. Meanwhile, comprehensive 
systems for early detection and containment of wildlife 
virus spillover and emergence remain one of our strongest 
responses against the threat posed by zoonotic viruses.
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